India-Nepal-China

A Changing Asian Order
Saurav Bhaumik

Nepal's quest for stability and economic development was largely dependent on India, which to a certain extent can be attributed to its adverse geographical location. In this context; it must be noted that Nepal bought virtually all the consumer goods including weapons and other associated strategic materials from India in the past (Mihaly, 1963). The land locked country thus shared an amicable relationship with India since time immemorial (Caroe, 1960). However, the intense political bonhomie shared by the nations has gradually culminated to a potent exemplar of international political dissonance. It can largely be imputed to the repeated failure on the part of India to mitigate the political tumult which has practically ravished Nepal's internal politics for the past two decades (Mishra, 2004). The Maoist insurgency is one such endogenous source of dissonance. Indian diplomats had consistently failed in their endeavors to arrive at a stable solution to the deepening political impasse. Instead, the Indian ventures have crafted a route for serious strategic ramifications to effectuate in the long run; which can serve as a detriment to the relation between the two nations.

Thus, on one side the Indian polity strictly denounced the Maoist activities and categorically termed it as an activity which comes within the realm of international terrorism (Swami, 2009). At the same time; the porous India-Nepal Border had inadvertently served as a potential Maoist Route for the further establishment of Maoist activities in Nepal. Given the situation that Maoist insurgency in Nepal has been one of the most successful insurgencies in the world (Mishra, 2004), the Maoists have seriously deterred the Indian policy and are now shaking hands with China. The Maoist insurgents, who fought a long civil war against the monarchy, now control most of the important public posts in Nepal, which is evident from the phenomenal rate of inclusion of the Maoists into the present governing coalition (Cartwright, 2009). From a prognostic contemplation on the issues at stake it can be inferred that China is tactically utilizing the degrading political fracture between India and Nepal. This has possibly increased the Chinese influence within the domain of Nepal's polity over the past few years. The recent hike in the Chinese investment in Nepal manifestly substantiates the aforesaid contention. Furthermore, the increasing links between the Nepalese Maoists and China can create a daunting security concern for India.1

Nepal due to its geographical location serves as a buffer zone locked between the two apparently hostile nations, i.e., India and China. Hence, it is evident from Nepal's geographical position that it will persistently get ridden with conflicting hegemonic conditions from the two Asian giants.

For one thing India at the governmental policy level has persistently deterred Maoist activities both within and outside the country. And notwithstanding, the anti-Maoist policy initiatives taken by the Government, the Nepali Maoists received continued moral support from India. It must be noted that most of the terrorism and insurgency related problems in India have cross- border linkages. A number of recent reports revealed that Nepal's Maoist insurgents were involved in smuggling drugs to raise money in order to buy arms. The Nepali Maoists carried out illicit cross-border arms trade (Nayak, 2008). Some report suggests that their soldiers were also trained in India (Gul, 2002).

An inherent contradiction thus emanates from the bare analysis of the facts at stake. Assessments of Indian security policy have traditionally centred on the direct military threat to India from Pakistan and China or on the indirect impact of superpower intervention in South Asia. However, since much of New Delhi's day-to-day diplomacy is preoccupied with South Asian problems, New Delhi exhibited increased willingness in the late 1980s to assert India's greater power directly and dramatically in smaller neighbouring countries.(Hagerty, 1991) This assertion finds its substratum rooted in the hidden moral support which India served to the Maoists. It manifestly exemplifies the gross mismanagement by India to stabilize its sensitive border with Nepal. There had been a concealed cooperation between the Indian and the Nepali Maoist insurgents. India primarily shook hands with the Nepali Maoists to overthrow the monarchic power, who had an antagonistic relationship with India. Since 1996, India started funding Nepali Maoists to fight against the state. Most of its leaders were backed up by the Indian government. Surprisingly India never helped the government of Nepal in arresting those leaders and extraditing them in Nepal. Therefore, it is evident that India never wanted peace in Nepal, despite the fact that India clearly declared an open war against Maoism. Interestingly India justified it on the basis that it wanted to abolish the autocratic regime under the monarch and establish parliamentary democracy in the country (Lohani, 2011).

It was thus a diplomatic endgame on the part of India. By ousting the monarch; with the aid of the Maoists, India wanted to establish her hegemony more firmly over Nepal's internal politics. But unfortunately, the Indian diplomats grossly failed in their attempt which inadvertently culminated to severe repercussions from both the factions. Though not explicit, the cooperation which was prevalent between the Maoists and India had indirectly resulted in the gross failure in India's peace process in Nepal. The aforementioned discussion should be analyzed in the light of the 12 Point Agreement which was engineered by India that directly brought the Maoists into the political mainstream (Bhatta, 2012). India's mediatory role in the 12 Point Agreement had brought immense dissatisfaction among the Nepalese Nationals. This is because the Maoist Government had brought nothing but corruption which was coupled with economic maladies. With more than 12,000 deaths in nine years, a homegrown Maoist insurgency, reinforced by ethnic and socioeconomic cleavages, has resulted in high levels of political violence and human rights violations in Nepal (Mitchell et al., 2006). The Indian Government has supported them to power. In this way the Nepali nationals have lost absolute faith in the Indian administration due to the proliferation of Maoist activities in Nepal. Despite the bare fact that India has internally waged a war against Maoist activities.

It is true that the porous Indo-Nepal border helped sustain the Maoist insurgency in Nepal for a decade. History illustrates that the Nepalese insurgents received considerable shelter and cover in India during the days of insurgency (Mishra, 2004). But the problem lies with the recent strained relationship which the Nepali Maoists are harbouring against the Indians. The Indian border security becomes the prime concern in this regard. It is the failure of the Government's internal policy that resulted in the inadequate regulation of its border with the neighbouring countries. India's fragile international border with Nepal virtually catalyzed the gross support which the Maoist insurgents received from India.

Chinese Advance
Whether the leaders in Delhi like it or not the Chinese foothold in the country has been strengthened over the past few years. Though the Chinese did make it clear that they would not want to entangle themselves within the labyrinth of Nepal's internal political theatre, its pro-active participation in Nepal's politics has increased over the past few years. It is interesting to note that earlier China did not have direct contact with Nepal (Kumari, 2005). No doubt the gradual advancement of China is a growing strategic threat for India, the primary reason of it being that India and China share similar goals in Nepal. This can indirectly lead to conflicting interests in the long run. Conflicting interests ernante from the economic interests of China and India in Nepal. One of the triggers to Chinese intervention in Nepal was to mitigate the Tibetan agitation which invoked the anti China sentiments in Nepal. And the Chinese had been quite successful to this end. China had developed links directly with Nepali security agencies and bureaucracy. Thus, reconstructing the initial dialectic, two contentious issues can be raised. The sole purpose for which China ventured into Nepal was to eradicate the anti China sentiments which persisted within its polity, due to its policy implications in Tibet. This can be further considered as the first limb of China's tactical interference in Nepal. This primary interest of China has since then transformed to several broader interests. The second vested interest on the Chinese counterpart was to maintain an affable trade relationship with Nepal.

Hitherto China has adopted an aggressive posture to weaken India's hold on Nepal. In this context it can be argued that China is not only courting the Nepalese Maoists, but also rendering political as well as material support to the Indian Maoists. Historical facts suggest that the Chinese never regarded the Maoists as terrorists (Mage, 2007). Information served by the Intelligence Agencies stated that many Chinese Centres have been identified in the terai region of Nepal which serves as centres for the dissemination of Maoist Ideology. There have been reports that Indian Maoists are also visiting these centres and indoctrinating the youth who are later to be recruited as red rebels. These centres are also used for anti-India propaganda. New Delhi was potently dissatisfied because of Kathmandu's arms purchases from China in 1988-89, including anti-aircraft weapons. It saw the arms acquisitions as a signal that Nepal viewed India as a hostile neighbour, and argued that Nepal had violated an agreement of 1965, between the two countries (Hagerty, 1991). From the aforementioned facts it is quite evident that the ulterior intentions of China, though not explicit, can be perceived from an in-depth study of its strategies. Hence, China can be termed as a "sleeping volcano". The communist giant never known for moral principles in its foreign policy sure enough stepped into the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of arms aid by India to Gynendra's Royal Army (Banerjee, 2006).

Another important factor is that the Maoists in Nepal often fan anti-Indian sentiments to shore up their nationalistic credentials. India regarded Maoists as a tool to overthrow the monarchy. And without the Indian aid it would have never been possible for the Maoist front to overthrow the powerful and established monarchy. Previously the monarch of Nepal had immense power. Not even the Communists dared to belittle the King or advocate a republic. (Levi, 1956) India believed that it could always play the Maoists against Nepal. India was indeed successful in this end (Cailmail, 2008).2 But it was utterly unwise on the part of India. An expanding Chinese presence in Nepal should be alarming for India, given that India and Nepal share a fragile and porous border. This anti-India sentiment can be skillfully utilized by the Chinese, given the situation that Maoists are in power. In truth China openly exhorted Nepali assertions of independence vis-a-vis India throughout the period till 1978. Intense anti-India propaganda was directed by China into Nepal (Ghoble, 1985). The Indians will however continue to be blamed as their hands are tied in terms of growing China-Maoist implicit pact in Nepal. China has previously perceived monarchy as a stable, credible and dependable partner. Thus the ousting of the monarchy raised dissatisfaction within the Chinese front.

China can also corner India economically by jeopardizing India's trade relations with Nepal. China has developed alternative trade routes in Nepal for its rise in trade and commerce in the Himalayas. China has been persistently aiding Nepal in building roads and investing billions of dollars in hydropower and telecommunications. In this context it can be articulated that China's rising economic encroachment in Nepal can be a future threat to India's Strategic interests. Nepal now regards China as a reliable friend, and thus the strengthening of the bilateral ties between the two countries is quite natural. Hence, it can be inferred that it might be a foreign policy initiative on the part of China to not only suffocate India in terms of security but also economically.

It is, thus, evident that the maintenance of peace process in Nepal had been a gross mismanagement by India. India's strategic and diplomatic failure in Nepal has indirectly hampered its peace process in Nepal, and has also opened a gateway for China to destabilize India. India had exhibited a strong deterrence against the Nepalese Maoists and even declared it as a form of terrorism. But implicitly it is India; who indirectly supported the Maoist insurgencies in Nepal to overthrow the monarchy. This inherent contradiction can act as an "Achilles Heel" for India in the long run. Though the Chinese intervention has not yet proliferated in India to an alarming extent. ooo

Notes:
1.    This is because most of the terrorism and insurgency related problems in India have cross-border linkages. Consequently, border management has become an integral component of India's internal security management.
2.   On April 11, 2008, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), became the first democratically elected Maoist party in world History, and has been recognized as such by the international community. Its election marked the end of a 240-year-old monarchy.

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Frontier
Vol. 45, No. 44, May 12-18, 2013

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